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Psychology and the A Priori Sciences 
 
 
 
 The ‘a priori sciences’1 to be considered here are logic and  
arithmetic;2 the ‘psychology’ includes experimental, especially 
developmental psychology, neurophysiology, and vision science.  My 
goal is to examine the role these empirical theories can play in the 
philosophies of those sciences, or more precisely, the role I think 
they should play.  Most of the psychological studies referred to here 
will be familiar to readers of this volume, though perhaps not the use 
to which I hope to put them. 
 
I.  Logic 
Common sense tells us that much of the world comes packaged into 
middle-sized objects -- stones, coins, snails, apples, trees, the 
bodies of cats, apes, human beings -- and not without reason; these 
items are what we see and touch, encounter and engage with, in 
everyday life.  Of course common sense doesn't always hold up under 
scrutiny, but meticulous science confirms that each of these is a 
                       
1  I use the term ‘a priori science’ as the customary label, not to endorse 
the view that these disciplines are in fact a priori in some sense or other. 
 
2  With a nod toward set theory in footnote 47. 
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rough collection of molecules, held together by various forces, 
resisting penetration due to other forces, moving as a bounded unit on 
a continuous spatiotemporal path.3  Scientifically refined common sense 
also reveals that these objects have properties and stand in 
relations:  stones come in a variety of sizes and shapes, apples in a 
various colors, domestic cats are generally smaller than adult humans.4  
This simple structuring validates a certain amount of rudimentary 
logic:  if the apple is either red or green, and it’s not red, then it 
must be green.  This might all seem so obvious, so unavoidable, as to 
be true no matter what, true in ‘all possible worlds’, but in fact it 
breaks down at the quantum level:  the particles don’t behave as 
bounded units on continuous paths; the sense in which they enjoy 
properties (like position and momentum) is problematic; and some 
simple logical laws (e.g., the distributive law) appear to fail.5  The 
inferences of this rudimentary logic are reliable as long as the 
requisite structure is in place, but not otherwise. 
                       
3  Some philosophers question this simple view on the grounds that the  
commonsense table is intuitively ‘solid’, while the scientific object is 
largely empty space, so the two cannot be the same.  Even assuming that 
common sense does picture things as continuous matter (over and above being 
impenetrable), it seems more natural to say science has taught us that the 
objects of common sense are different than we first imagined, not that they 
don’t exist.  (For a bit on more such thinking from Eddington, Sellers, and 
Ladyman and Ross, see [2014], pp. 95-97, p. 99, footnote 9.)  Other 
philosophers go farther, rejecting everything in science and common sense on 
radical skeptical grounds, but this challenge, too, I set aside for present 
purposes (for more, see [201?]). 
    
4  Dependencies between one situation and other are also important -- the coin 
is on the floor because the cat shoved it off the table -- as are universal 
properties, but I leave these aside for simplicity in this quick sketch of 
[2007], III.4 (also [2014]).   
 
5  In another skeptical move, it’s sometimes suggested that science can’t 
serve to ratify the objects of common sense, because any science that begins 
with those objects will inevitably end up ratifying them.  In fact, a science 
(ours) that begins with them has ended up without them in the quantum world. 
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Psychology comes into this story as an investigation of how we 
come to those early commonsense beliefs about objects and their 
features.  The ground-breaking developmental work of the 1980s and 90s6 
showed that young infants track cohesive, bounded, solid7 individuals, 
despite occlusions, using spatiotemporal criteria like contiguity, 
common fate, and continuous motion; though they’re aware of object’s 
other properties, they typically don’t use regularities of shape, 
color, texture or motion, or features or kinds to determine object 
boundaries or identity.8  Studies of neonates and non-human animals 
suggest a distant evolutionary origin. 
There’s some disagreement over the precise interpretation of 
these experimental results.  The contents of ‘the object concept’ vary 
slightly from writer to writer;9 disagreements arise over whether the 
abilities catalogued are purely perceptual or somehow conceptual;10 and 
                       
6  For a summary with references, see [2007], pp. 245-258.  Carey [2009] 
(chapters 2 and 3) is a much-discussed survey and philosophical elaboration 
by one of the leading researchers in the area.  This work swept away the 
earlier seminal theories of Piaget (featured in [1990], pp. 54-5), according 
to which the ability to represent objects comes later in development.  Carey 
[2009], pp. 46-55, gives a fascinating re-analysis of Piaget’s evidence. 
  
7  That is, impenetrable (a feature of both Eddington’s tables in footnote 3). 
 
8  Animate/inanimate, human/non-human appear to be exceptions.  See Carey 
[2009], pp. 263-284, especially pp. 276-277, for more on this point. 
 
9  In one of the more dramatic examples, Burge departs from many psychologists 
(from Piaget on) in holding that the ‘constitutive conditions’ for 
representing bodies as such don’t include tracking through occlusion:  ‘a 
capacity to perceptually track a body as a three-dimensionally bounded and 
cohesive volume shape while it remains in view … suffices’ (Burge [2010], p. 
460).  In contrast, Hatfield [2009] requires tracking through occlusion, but 
holds that the developmental evidence doesn’t conclusively show infants are 
representing objects as ‘individual material objects (not as mere local 
collections of properties) … that … occupy … distinct … space-time worms … 
throughout their existence’ (Hatfield [2009], p. 241). 
  
10  E.g., Burge [2010], pp. 438-450, in disagreement with Spelke [1998].   
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so on.11  Fortunately, these niceties needn’t trouble us here because 
any of these options will be enough to serve as the building blocks, 
the ‘objects with properties’, in the rudimentary logical structure 
described above. 
But ‘object with properties’ aren’t all there is to that 
rudimentary structure:  a stone has a size and a shape, an apple can 
be red or green, a coin can fail to be a quarter.  More developmental 
work of the 80s and 90s shows that young infants classify cats and 
dogs so as to exclude birds, and even cats so as to exclude 
superficially similar dogs.  They’re also sensitive to correlations of 
features:  infants12 aware of three possibilities for each of the 
features A, B, C, D, and E (that is, A1, A2, and A3, and so on), 
habituated to items with correlations between these features -- for 
example, items with (A1˄B1˄C1)˄(D1˅D2)˄E1˅E2) and items with 
(A2˄B2˄C2)˄(D1˅D2)˄(E1˅E2) --  find a new correlated combination (like 
A2-B2-C2-D1-E2) familiar but an uncorrelated combination (like A1-B2-
C1-D1-E2) just as novel as one that’s entirely new (like A3-B3-C3-D3-
                       
11  It could be that some of these disagreements run deeper than the sort of 
thing scouted in footnote 9.  Sticking with Burge and Hatfield as our 
examples, notice that Burge takes the goal of the project to be determining 
what’s ‘constitutive’ of objecthood -- ‘Our question concerns necessary 
minimal constitutive conditions for having the capacity to attribute the kind 
body in perception’ (Burge [2010], p. 465) -- where this presupposes a fact 
of the matter to be discovered (perhaps by rational intuition, perhaps with a 
hint of essentialism in the appeal to ‘natural kinds’).  In contrast, 
Hatfield [2009], p. 241) only claims that ‘we as adult perceivers typically 
see [things] as individual objects’ with the features listed in footnote 9, 
and that the developmental evidence doesn’t establish that infants do this, 
too.  He describes this situation by referring to ‘the adult concept’, but 
there’s no indication of an underlying Burge-like metaphysics; he could just 
be using the phrase to highlight the possibility of a significant cognitive 
shift.   
 
12  This pattern and the next emerge in 10-month-olds, still pre-linguistic. 
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E3)!  In addition to these conjunctions, infants also appear sensitive 
to disjunctions -- habituated to cats or horses, they find a dog novel 
-- and to relations -- for example, ‘above’, ‘below’, ‘between’.  
Results like these strongly suggest that we humans are sensitive to 
rudimentary logical structures from an early age.13 
Still, as is well-known, it’s entirely possible to respond to a 
feature of the world without representing it:  the frog’s visual 
system might allow it to detect (then catch and eat) flies without 
representing them as flies.  On this point, I’m less confident than 
Tyler Burge that ‘representation’ is a psychological natural kind,14 
and even more doubtful that its contours can be discovered, as he 
suggests, by uniquely philosophical means.15  In contrast, Gary 
Hatfield [1988] undertakes a more modest task, firmly grounded in 
contemporary vision science.16  An ongoing debate pits those who 
believe that the visual system employs symbolic representations in an 
internal symbolic ‘language’ -- that rules are encoded and applied, 
hypotheses formed and tested (in the tradition of Helmholtz) -- and 
those who insist that the visual system is not representational, that 
it’s simply tuned to directly register the rich and complex 
                       
13  For a summary, with references, see [2007], pp. 258-262. 
 
14  See Burge [2010], p.291: ‘Psychological explanations have a distinct 
explanatory paradigm.  Psychology … discovers its own kinds.  One of them is 
the kind representation’.   
 
15  See Burge [2010], p. xviii:  ‘philosophy has … a set of methodological and 
conceptual tools that position it uniquely to make important contributions to 
understanding the world. … Many of its topics remain of broadest human 
concern.  Where, constitutively, representational mind begins is such a 
topic’.   
 
16  Obviously this contrast (elaborated in footnotes 14 and 15) is reminiscent 
of the one in footnotes 9 and 11.   
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information available in the ever-changing array of ambient light 
(Gibson and his followers).  Both sides acknowledge that processing 
takes place between the retina and the visual experience.  The debate 
between them hinges on the question:  is this processing purely 
physiological or does it break down into psychologically significant 
components, and in particular, into components with a 
characteristically representational role?17  Hatfield threads the 
needle between the two schools of thought, arguing that there are 
representational components, but that they needn’t involve a symbolic 
system. 
To see how this goes, consider using a slide rule to multiply n 
times m:  locate n on the A scale; slide 1 on the B scale beneath n on 
the A scale; find the number on the A scale that’s above m on the B 
scale.  The procedure works because the scales are laid out 
logarithmically and n x m = ln-1(ln(n) + ln(m)).  That same equation 
could be programmed into a digital computer and multiplication carried 
out in that way, in which case the logarithmic algorithm itself would 
be encoded, represented, in the computer’s program, but this isn’t 
true for the slide rule:  there, the algorithm is effectively 
followed, but it isn’t literally represented.18  The lengths on the 
slide rule represent numbers because of what the device is designed to 
                       
17  See Ullman [1980], p. 374, Hatfield [1988], §1. 
 
18  As Burge ([2010], p. 504) points out, an odometer’s computation of the 
distance travelled depends on the circumference of the tires (it records a 
tick for each rotation), but the circumference is nowhere represented.  
Hatfield ([1988], p. 75) makes a similar point about a ‘tension adder’:  n 
and m are represented by small weights placed on a pan and their sum 
registered by a pointer on the front of the device, but no algorithm is 
encoded.   
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do (multiply, among other things) and how it was designed to do it 
(relying on, but not representing, the properties of logarithms).  The 
computer is also designed to multiply (among other things), but it’s 
designed to do so quite differently, by applying explicit rules in an 
internal symbolic system.  So, what a device does or doesn’t represent 
depends on how it does what it’s designed to do.   
If we now replace the slide rule designer or the computer 
programmer with the evolutionary pressures on our species,19 the 
representational status of some element of the visual system can be 
assessed in the same way:  it depends on the function of the visual 
system in the evolved human organism, the function of that element 
within the visual system, and the method it uses to perform that 
function.20  Hatfield ([1988], pp. 63-65) gives the example of seeing a 
circle at a slant rather than an ellipse.  This function could be 
achieved by registering the retinal ellipse, registering slant 
information from shading, and computationally combining these two; or 
it might be achieved by a single registration of shading across the 
retinal ellipse.  Obviously it’s an empirical matter which of these 
algorithms is actually implemented; it can be investigated by 
psychological experiments with carefully timed disruptions or by 
physiological investigation of the neuroanatomy.  In these ways, we 
could determine whether or not, say, the projective retinal shape by 
                       
19  In practice, determining what aspects of the visual system are adaptations 
and which are spandrels is a very difficult undertaking.  See, e.g., Warren 
[2012], Anderson [2015]. 
 
20  Burge [2010], chapter 8, soundly rejects accounts of representation based 
in biological function, for reasons I don’t fully understand and won’t 
attempt to explicate. 
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itself is represented.  But either way, it’s not at all obvious that 
this sort of representation would involve a symbolic system.21 
So, to return to our theme, we know that infants respond to 
conjunctions, disjunctions, negations, and so on, but do they actually 
represent them as such?  As Burge notes ([2010], p. 406), the fact 
that we infer in accord with a logical rule doesn’t imply that the 
rule is somehow encoded in our psychology, presumably in some language 
of thought.  Our concern here, though, isn’t with inference, but with 
simple logical structuring, and (following Hatfield) the 
representation needn’t be symbolic.  The question is whether the 
infant represents the stone as small and round, the apple as red or 
green, the coin as not-a-quarter.  Assuming that sensory sensitivity 
to these worldly features is adaptive,22 a Hatfield-style answer to 
this question hinges on how that sensory sensitivity is achieved:  
does the scientific story of that ability break down into 
psychologically significant parts, into representational components, 
like the separate representations of projective shape and of shading 
                       
21  Does this mean that the frog is representing flies?  Opponents of 
biological function views suggest that evolutionary considerations aren’t 
enough to show that the frog is representing flies as opposed to moving black 
dots, or even flies as opposed to nothing at all, given that a frog’s 
detector will occasionally go off on its own.  Regarding the first point as 
subject to further investigation, granting it now only for the sake of 
argument, Hatfield contends that nevertheless biological function ‘can serve 
as the basis for ascribing to states of the frog’s visual system the content 
target fly/moving dot, or some such coarse-grained content’, that ‘[a]mong 
the functions of the frog’s visual system is to represent small moving things 
as being there when they are, and not to represent them as being there when 
they aren’t (Hatfield [1991], pp. 122-123).  In other words, the biological 
function account has room to regard the frog’s detector as having misfired 
when it goes off on its own. 
 
22  See footnote 19. 
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information in the multi-stage algorithm for seeing the circle at a 
slant?  For our case:  given that the infant can represent stones, 
smallness and roundness, is her representation of a small, round stone 
related to other representations in a way that merits describing it as 
a conjunctive representation?  This needn’t involve encoding in some 
language of thought any more that the circle-at-a-slant case does, but 
it is a straightforward empirical question for experimental psychology 
and neuroscience.   
If a definitive answer to this question is known, it isn’t known 
to me, but the study of visual working memory offers a hint of how a 
small part of it might go.  Evidence suggests that we’re able to store 
information about a limited number of objects (around four) and their 
features over short periods of time.  This raises the question how 
several features of one object are bound together:  what distinguishes 
a scene with a vertical red bar and a horizontal green bar from one 
with a vertical green bar and a horizontal red one?  One proposal is 
synchronized neural firing:  a particular neuron fires repeatedly to 
encode a single feature; when the repeated firings of the neurons for 
two separate features are synchronized, they form a unit, ‘cell 
assembly’.23  In Hatfield’s terms, the initial firings represent red, 
green, horizontal and vertical bars; when the ‘vertical’ and ‘red’ 
neurons fire in unison, the resulting assembly represents a vertical 
red bar.  The position I’m proposing, on pure speculation, requires 
                       
23  See Vogel, Woodman, and Luck [2001] for discussion and references.  Also 
Olson and Jiang [2002]. 
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that this isn’t exceptional, that rudimentary logical structuring is 
widely represented, one way or another. 
If all this is granted, what role is psychology playing in this 
philosophy of logic?  The ground of logical truth, what makes it true 
(where it is true), is the objective logical structuring in the world, 
so there’s no trace of psychologism.  Psychology’s role, then, might 
be thought to be epistemological.  For example, a sufficiently 
externalist epistemologist, one who thinks the evolutionary pressures 
responsible for our logical cognition produce a reliable process,24 
might conclude that we know (at least some of) the world’s logical 
structure a priori.  I prefer to leave the policing of ‘know’ and ‘a 
priori’ to the specialists and to say only this much:  we come to 
believe what we do about the logical structures in the world on the 
basis of primitive cognitive mechanisms, many of which we share with 
other animals, but our evidence for the correctness of those beliefs 
comes from common sense and its subsequent (partial) ratification by 
scientific means.   
So far, this is a fairly slight philosophical impact for 
psychology, but I think there’s an important moral concerning our 
philosophical preconceptions about logical truth.  Because our logical 
beliefs rest on such primitive cognitive mechanisms, it’s hard for us 
to see how things could be otherwise, how a world failing to 
instantiate those rudimentary logical forms is even possible.  When 
                       
24  This needn’t be a fallacious argument of the form:  ‘this evolved, 
therefore it’s reliable’.  Instead, it might run roughly along the lines 
traced here:  first science establishes that much of the world is logically 
structured; then psychology defends an evolutionary story of how we come to 
detect and represent that structure.   
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quantum mechanics shows us not only that a world can fail do this, but 
that our very own micro-world so fails, often the result is that we 
find quantum mechanics deeply problematic, not that we take logic 
itself to be contingent.25  It seems to me that the psychology here is 
showing us why we’re so easily inclined to believe that logical truth 
is necessary, a priori, certain -- a stubborn preconception that 
vastly distorts our theorizing about it.26  It’s hard to imagine a more 
valuable lesson for the philosophy of logic! 
 
II.  Arithmetic 
 Obviously any patch of the world with logical structuring into 
objects with properties, standing in relations, will also have number 
properties:  so many objects, so many with this particular feature, so 
many standing in this relation to this particular individual, and so 
on.  When it comes to our cognitive access to those number properties, 
though, it’s well known that the first four or so have special status:  
infants’ expectations about how many objects will appear behind a 
screen after individual objects have been added or removed are 
accurate up to 3; adults can hold 3-4 objects in working memory27 and 
                       
25  I suspect many of us have heard our fellow philosophers assert with great 
confidence that quantum mechanics must be false, on a priori grounds. 
 
26  See [2014a], chapter 6, for a comparison of this conclusion with the late 
Wittgenstein’s take on logic. 
 
27  Feigenson [2011] describes how visual working memory can encode more than 
four slots worth of information by ‘chunking’, as when we remember a phone 
number by dividing it into three blocks of digits, or one of her infant 
subjects remembers two cats and two cars, but not four individual cats. (See 
also Carey [2009], pp. 149-150.)  The ‘chunk’ is often referred to as a 
‘set’, as exhibiting the higher ranks that differentiate sets from mere 
aggregates.  I once appealed to analogous considerations (e.g., in [1990], p. 
165), but for what it’s worth, I’m no longer convinced anything essentially 
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track 3-4 objects through complex motions, but these abilities break 
down quickly for higher quantities.  Non-human animals share these 
abilities and limitations, indicating another primitive cognitive 
system.28 
 The mechanism underlying these abilities -- the object-tracking 
or parallel individuation system -- apparently includes so-called 
‘object files’ of mid-level vision,29 which follow objects 
spatiotemporally and encode features as they go (‘it’s a bird, it’s a 
plane, it’s Superman’), and visual working memory, which keeps visual 
information accessible over short periods.30  The two are closely 
intertwined, with some evidence of complementary emphases, on tracking 
over motion and retention of object properties, respectively.31  Though 
the infant expectation experiments are often described in arithmetic 
terms -- 1+1=2, 3-2=1 -- it’s widely agreed that these representations 
are not truly numerical:  not ‘3’, but the simply logical ‘a thing, 
another thing, and yet another thing’, most likely the opening of 
three successive object files.32  In cases of ‘subitizing’ -- immediate 
                                                                        
‘higher-order’ is involved in such cases.  Seeing two cats and two cars could 
just be a particular way of seeing the cats and the cars, not a way of seeing 
something else (a set of cats, a set of cars). 
  
28  See [2007], pp. 319-326, for more on the story in this and the following 
three paragraphs, with references.  See Carey [2009], chapter 8, for her 
elaboration. 
 
29  Kahnemann et al [1992].  See [2007], pp. 255-257, 319-320, for a brief 
discussion with references.   
 
30  See, e.g., the references in footnote 23.   
 
31  See Hollingworth and Rasmussen [2010].  The two are often lumped together 
without comment, or even identified.   
 
32  Burge points out that ‘[t]here need be no use of conjunction or negation 
in the perceptual representation (as in:  this is a body and this is a body 
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recognition (without counting) of up to 3 or 4 objects -- perhaps 
visual working memory is engaged, but again, mostly likely through the 
opening of three distinct information slots,33 rather than an explicit 
numerical representation.   
 Yet another primitive system we share with other animals is 
sensitive to approximate quantities:  it can distinguish 1 dot from 3 
more easily than 2 dots from 3 (the ‘distance effect’); it can 
distinguish 2 dots from 3, but not 8 dots from 9 (the ‘magnitude 
effect’).34  The mechanism for this is so far unknown (at least to me), 
but neurological studies on monkeys suggest a two-step process that 
begins with a group of neurons that encode locations of objects, 
ignoring other features, then feeds into an array of neurons whose 
responses are bell-shaped curves each peaking at a certain number.35  
This model would explain the distance effect -- the ranges of firing 
for ‘1-neurons’ and ‘3-neurons’ overlap less than those for ‘2-
neurons’ and ‘3-neurons’ -- and the magnitude effect -- the bell 
curves for large numbers are broader.  In any case, this is clearly a 
more quantitative system than the object tracker, but it can’t truly 
be said to represent cardinality.  Burge ([2010], p. 482) suggests a 
return to the ancient notion of ‘pure magnitude’, neither continuous 
                                                                        
and this is not that)’ (Burge [2010], p. 486).  He’s right:  it’s unlikely 
that anything like this is encoded in a language of thought.  But in 
Hatfield’s terms, the opening of three successive object files could 
represent the corresponding logical feature of the scene. 
 
33  See Chesney and Haladjian [2011] for evidence that subitizing and object 
tracking rely on a shared visual mechanism. 
 
34  See, e.g., Carey [2009], pp. 118-137, Dehaene [2011]. 
 
35  See Dehaene [2011], pp. 247-254, Neider [2011]. 
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nor discrete, but nevertheless stands in ratios.  However that may be, 
what matters for our purposes is that features of the world’s logical 
structure are being represented, albeit only approximately.36   
 So far, we’re in step with the non-human animals, still far short 
of human arithmetic.  The leading theory is that what sets us apart is 
the child’s ability to combine the proto-numerical fruits of the 
object-tracking system and the approximate system via her command of 
the counting sequence.37  ‘One, two, three …’ is first learned as a 
verbal nonsense scheme -- like ‘eeny, meeny, miney, moe …’ -- and the 
act of reciting it while pointing to each of a group of objects in 
turn is just play, of no numerical significance.  Young children do 
realize that use of the word ‘one’ correlates with the presence of a 
single object, with a single opened object file or a single item in 
visual working memory, but the sense of larger number words comes only 
gradually, between 2½ and 3½:  first ‘two’ is associated with the 
presence of an object and another; a few months later ‘three’, and 
maybe even ‘four’, gains meaning from the object-tracking system.38  
This far the non-human animals can follow, but what happens next is 
                       
36  Oddly enough, on small numbers, where the two systems overlap, the 
infant’s object tracking system appears to override the approximate system.  
E.g., they prefer a box where 3 treats have been placed to a box where 1 or 2 
treats have been placed, but when the numbers are 2 and 5, beyond the object 
tracker’s capacity, they perform at chance -- despite the fact that the ratio 
is big enough for the approximate system to detect easily.  See Carey [2009], 
pp. 84-85, 139-141, 153-155. 
  
37  Here again, Piaget was in disagreement.  See Dehaene [2011], pp. 30-36, 
for an amusing account of how the empirical results were misinterpreted.   
 
38  Some hold that the object-tracking system isn’t involved, that the 
underlying mechanism here is the approximate number system (see, e.g., Piazza 
[2011]), which is most precise for small numbers.  Dehaene ([2011], pp. 256-
259), who once entrusted small numbers to the approximate number system (what 
he calls ‘the number sense’), explains what changed his mind.   
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uniquely human:  apparently the child notices that an extra object in 
the scene corresponds to the next number in the counting sequence, and 
suddenly the true meaning of counting becomes clear:  the last number 
recited in the procedure is the number of objects in the scene.  
 It’s sometimes assumed that this is the end of the story of how 
humans come to a full understanding of arithmetic, but it isn’t, for 
at least two reasons.  First, consider a child who knows how to count, 
and knows there are ‘just as many’ of these as those when the same 
number word results from counting these as those.  That is, she knows 
that if she counts n children and n cookies, she’ll be able to give 
each child exactly one cookie with no cookies left over.  Richard Heck 
makes the case that a child can know all this without having the 
notion of a one-to-one correspondence, which is, after all, ‘very 
sophisticated’ (Heck ([2000], p. 170).  Of course when she counts, she 
forms what we understand to be a one-to-one correspondence, but she 
needn’t understand it as such; she’s just implementing the counting 
procedure.39  So this is one respect in which the child still hasn’t 
grasped a notion some consider essential to the concept of ‘cardinal 
number’.   
 Another tempting assumption is that a child who understands that 
one more object corresponds to the next number word must also 
                       
39  Heck also notes that the child can understand ‘just as many’ without 
understanding counting:  there are just as many cookies as children if she 
can make sure everyone has exactly one cookie with none left over.  He then 
shows how the Peano Axioms can be derived with ‘just as many’ in place of 
Frege’s ‘one-to-one correspondence’.   
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understand that there’s no largest number.40  The only empirical study 
touching on this question that I know of, Harnett and Gelman [1998], 
actually aims to show that it’s relatively easy for children to learn 
that the number sequence has no end -- easy compared to learning 
fractions! -- so its design includes more coaching than would be ideal 
for present purposes.  Still, children in kindergarten and first 
grade41 did quite poorly on questions like ‘is there a biggest number 
of all numbers?’ and ‘is there a last number?’.  They did somewhat 
better but still far from perfectly on leading questions like ‘if we 
count and count and count, will we ever get to the end of the 
numbers?’ and ‘can we always add one more, or is there a number so big 
we’d have to stop?’, despite having been primed with exercises in 
counting larger and larger numbers.42 
Explaining their answers, the six-year-olds might suggest that we 
have to stop counting ‘cause you need to eat breakfast and dinner’ or 
‘because we need sleep’, or that we couldn’t then start up again where 
we left off because ‘you forget where you stopped’.  There’s even a 
hint at mortality:  if we try to add one more after counting to a very 
big number, ‘I guess you’ll be old, very old’.  Though answers like 
these were classified as ‘unacceptable’, there is an straightforward 
sense in which the children have it right:  there are practical 
                       
40  For a bit more on the line of thought in the remainder of this section, 
see [2014b]. 
 
41  Averaging just under 6 and 7 years old, respectively. 
 
42  One group of subjects in one of the studies was questioned about the 
largest number, etc., before the counting exercises.  Their performance was 
even worse than the group who did the counting exercises first.   
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limitations on how far we’re inclined to count, and even physical 
limits on how far we could count.43  The young children aren’t wrong 
exactly, they’re just failing to grasp the spirit of the question.  
What’s being asked is whether there’s any limit to how far we could 
count, in principle. 
 In contrast to the kindergarteners and first graders, the second 
graders44 in this study generally answered the questions as they were 
intended:  there is no largest number, period.  Closer analysis of the 
experimental results led Harnett and Gelman to the observation that 
the children in a position ‘to benefit from a conversation that offers 
cues’ (p. 361) were those who could count beyond 100: 
Once children master the sequence from 1 to 20 and the list of 
decade words, they have most but not all of the vocabulary they 
need to apply the recursive procedures by which larger and larger 
numbers are generated.  As they count beyond 100, they come to 
learn that not only the digits, but also the decade terms, are 
recycled over and over.  [Younger] [c]hildren are still at work 
memorizing the teens and decade terms and are less able to 
appreciate that the count sequences is systematic.  (Harnett and 
Gelman [1998], p. 361)45 
 
This suggests, as the psychologist Paul Bloom proposes, that  
[T]he generative nature of human numerical cognition develops 
only as a result of children acquiring the linguistic counting 
system of their culture.  Many, but not all, human groups have 
invented a way of using language to talk about number, through 
use of a recursive symbolic grammar.  (Bloom [2000], p. 236) 
 
                       
43  Russell once remarked that running through an infinite decimal expansion 
is ‘medically impossible’ (Russell [1935/6], p. 143). 
   
44  Averaging just under 8 years old. 
 
45  Though Harnett and Gelman speak of ‘recursive procedures by which larger 
and larger numbers are generated’, obviously they’re talking about linguistic 
procedures that generate numerical expressions.  (Understanding that adding 
one results in a larger number was another predictor for successful response 
to the cues.)   
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This would mean that children’s belief in the infinity of the numbers 
derives from their belief in the infinity of numerical expressions, 
not vice versa: 
[I]t is not that somehow children know that there is an infinity 
of numbers and infer that you can always produce a larger number 
word.  Instead, they learn that one can always produce a larger 
number word and infer that there must therefore be an infinity of 
numbers.  (Ibid., p. 238) 
 
In this way, our question -- how do we come to believe there’s no 
largest number? -- is pushed back one step to:  how do we come to 
believe that there’s no largest numerical expression? 
 Harnett and Gelman’s studies show that it’s quite easy for 
children to come to this view once they’ve appreciated the intricacies 
of the systematic generation of numerical expressions.  What’s 
striking is that they don’t seem bothered by concerns about the 
practical or physical limitations on, for example, the length of those 
numerical expressions or the breathe needed to utter them or the need 
to stop for lunch -- all that apparently matters is coming to grasp 
the recursive character of the rules of formation.  Why is the 
intended ‘in principle’ reading of the question more natural here, 
when it’s posed for numerical expressions, than it was when posed for 
the numbers themselves?  To engage once again in rank speculation, I 
suggest that this traces to the recursive element of the innate 
linguistic faculty, whatever it is in our genetically endowed 
cognitive machinery that underlies our ability to understand and 
produce indefinitely varied and complex linguistic items: 
All approaches agree that a core property of [the linguistic 
faculty] is recursion … [The linguistic faculty] takes a finite 
set of elements and yields a potentially infinite array of 
discreet expressions.  This capacity … yields a discrete infinity 
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(a property that also characterizes the natural numbers).  
(Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch [2002], p. 1571) 
 
The suggestion is that this linguistic capacity is what produces our 
intuitive grasp of the ‘in principle’ question. 
 Assuming this sketch of the psychology is roughly right -- a big 
assumption, subject to empirical test -- the consequences for the 
philosophy of arithmetic are fundamental.  Simple arithmetical claims 
like 2+2=4 and 12<191 are ordinary facts about worldly logical 
structures (where they’re present), but the subject matter of 
mathematical arithmetic -- the standard model, what we now think of as 
an omega-sequence -- doesn’t depend on any contingent features of the 
actual world, which may or may not be finite.  Insofar as arithmetic 
is  ‘about’ anything, it’s about an intuitive picture of a recursive 
sequence of potentially infinite extent, an intuitive picture we 
humans share thanks to the evolved linguistic faculty common to our 
species.   
 Now we all tend to believe that the structure of the standard 
model of arithmetic, that simple omega-sequence, is coherent, unique 
and determinate.  But if it’s really just a matter of an intuitive 
picture, what reason do we have to believe these things?  As 
Wittgenstein once asked, ‘what if the picture began to flicker in the 
far distance?’ (RFM, V.10).  Our innate cognitive structuring may well 
give rise to these firm convictions, but if the story told here is 
correct, our capacity for mathematical arithmetic could be a mere 
spandrel, generated just by the way as we evolved toward language, and 
even if it is an adaption in itself, that’s no guarantee of 
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reliability.46  Under the circumstances, we reflective beings should 
want more support for our faith in the cogency of an omega-sequence 
than just our brute inclination to believe it.  I think there are 
facts we can appeal to, but they’re hardly conclusive:  our biological 
similarity as humans is reason to think your intuitive picture is 
more-or-less the same as mine; the apparent coherence of the picture, 
plus long experience of the species with mathematical arithmetic, 
provides some evidence for its consistency; the lack of any important 
independent statement comparable to the Continuum Hypothesis suggests 
it may be fully determinate.47  But our sense that arithmetic is more 
secure than that may be an illusion -- another valuable lesson from 
psychology! 
 
III.  Conclusions 
 Though psychologists sometimes take their work to support a brand 
of anti-realism about mathematics -- Stanislas Dehaene’s influential 
                       
46  See the fallacy described in footnote 24. 
 
47  There’s an analogous question for set theory, where the relevant intuitive 
picture -- the iterative hierarchy -- seems to rest on three elements:  
recursion (presumably based in the same cognitive faculty as the standard 
model of arithmetic); the combinatorial notion of an arbitrary subset, not 
beholden to any rule, definition, or construction (perhaps related to Heck’s 
‘very sophisticated’ one-to-one correspondence?); and Cantor’s gusty bet on 
the completed infinite (see [1988], I.5).  This picture isn’t definitive of 
the field in the way the standard model is for arithmetic:  it wasn’t present 
when set theory was founded by Cantor and others, and it could be altered or 
replaced in the future (e.g., by the multiverse conception, though for now 
I’m skeptical about that (see [201?a], III)).  In any case, given the added 
vagaries of the two additional elements, any case for cogency is 
correspondingly weaker:  determinacy is undercut by independent statements 
like the CH, and our biological similarity gives less support for uniqueness.  
Perhaps the apparent coherence of the conception delivers some evidence of 
consistency, but considerably less than in the case of arithmetic.  Still, 
this would be a form of so-called ‘intrinsic’ support distinct from the 
merely instrumental role described in [2011]. 
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Number Sense, for example, bears the subtitle How the Mind Creates 
Mathematics -- in fact their skepticism doesn’t extend to the 
contingent logical/numerical structure I’ve been attributing to the 
world or our cognitive access to it:  
[A]rithmetic … draw[s] upon a store of fundamental knowledge 
accumulated over millions of years of evolution in a physical 
world which, at the scale we live it, is … numerically 
structured.  (Dehaene in Dehaene and Brannon [2011], p. 187, 
emphasis added) 
 
This type of straightforward realism breaks down, I’ve suggested, with 
the potential infinite, the standard model of arithmetic, where 
attention to the psychological facts reveals that our cognitive 
architecture does, in a sense, ‘create’ the subject matter under 
investigation.  In addition to this positive semantic or metaphysical 
conclusion, empirical work in psychology also uncovers the less-than-
firm underpinings of some of our firmest philosophical preconceptions:  
that logic is necessary, that arithmetic is obviously cogent 
(coherent, unique, determinate).  This valuable therapeutic helps free 
the philosophies of these subjects from traditional baggage and set 
them on a more vital course.  In these ways, psychological inquiry 
stands to play a central, highly beneficial role in our philosophizing 
about the a priori disciplines.48  
 
 
 
Penelope Maddy 
                       
48  Thanks to Gary Hatfield, Ethan Galebach, Reto Gubelmann, and Sorin Bangu 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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